AGO Opinion 97014
Constitutionality of LB 482
Opinion 97014
DATE: February 21, 1997
SUBJECT: Constitutionality of LB 482
REQUESTED BY: Senator Stan Schellpeper, Chairperson,
General Affairs Committee
WRITTEN BY: Don Stenberg, Attorney General
Laurie Smith Camp, Deputy Attorney General
You have asked whether a provision in LB 482 would withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Specifically, you request our opinion on
the constitutionality of the following language contained in
Sections 4 and 16 of the bill:
Nothing in the act shall be construed or interpreted to limit
the powers of local governing bodies to (1) suspend, cancel
and revoke retail licenses, bottle club licenses, and craft
brewery licenses . . . .
. . . .
The governing body of any city or village with respect to
licenses within its corporate limits and the governing body of
any county with respect to licenses not within the corporate
limits of any city or village but within the county shall have
the following powers, functions, and duties with respect to
retail, bottle club, and craft brewery licenses:
. . . .
(2) To suspend, cancel or revoke, after receiving a citizen's
complaint pursuant to Section 53-134.04 or on its own motion,
any license if it determines that the licensee has violated
any provision of the Nebraska Liquor Control act, any rule or
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February 21, 1997
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regulation adopted and promulgated pursuant to the Act, or any
ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation relating to
alcoholic liquor. Any administrative proceeding instituted by
a local governing body to suspend, cancel, or revoke a license
shall be a contested case conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Such order of
suspension, cancellation or revocation shall be subject to
review as provided in Section 53-1,116 . . . .
As you note in your letter, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
ruled that state laws which provided local governing bodies with
authority to approve or deny retail liquor licenses were
unconstitutional because they delegated authority to the local
governing bodies without sufficient, definite, and adequate
standards to guide those affected by them. In Bosselman, Inc. v.
State, 230 Neb. 471 (1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that
LB 911, passed in 1986, unconstitutionally delegated the state's
legislative power regarding approval or denial of liquor licenses,
because the standards by which such powers were to be administered
by local governing bodies had not been clearly and definitely
stated in the legislature's authorizing act and instead rested on
indefinite, obscure, or vague generalities. Id. at 476. In 1989,
the Nebraska Legislature attempted to address the deficiencies of
LB 911 by enacting LB 781 to provide local governing bodies with
the authority to grant or deny liquor licenses based on more
explicit criteria. In 1992, the legislature took the additional
precautionary measure of placing a proposed constitutional
amendment on the November 1992 general election ballot to provide
a constitutional basis for the authority of local governing bodies
to approve or deny retail liquor licenses. The proposed amendment
to the Nebraska Constitution was adopted, and became Art. XV, § 19,
of the Constitution:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the
governing bodies of municipalities and counties are empowered
to approve, deny, suspend, cancel, or revoke retail and bottle
club liquor licenses within their jurisdictions as authorized
by the legislature.
On February 16, 1993, the provisions of LB 781 were reenacted
through LB 183 to bolster the legislature's position that the
provisions of LB 781 and LB 183 did not lack a constitutional
basis. On April 9, 1993, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the
issue of the constitutionality of LB 781 in the case of Kwik Shop,
Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 243 Neb. 178 (1993). The Plaintiff, Kwik
Shop, had challenged the constitutionality of LB 781 under both the
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February 21, 1997
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Nebraska Constitution and Federal Constitution. The Nebraska
Supreme Court found that the 20 standards established by LB 781
(codified at § 53-134(2)(a) through (t)) did not provide local
governing bodies with adequate, sufficient, and definite standards
within which to exercise their discretion, and did not provide
potential applicants with a reasonable opportunity to know what was
required to obtain a license. The Court found that the provisions
of LB 781 incorporated in § 53-134 were, therefore,
unconstitutionally vague and did not meet the requirements of
procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. The Court also found that the
provisions of LB 781 contained in § 53-134 were an unconstitutional
delegation of power from a legislative authority to an
administrative or executive authority, in violation of Art. II, §
1, of the Nebraska Constitution, because those provisions did not
provide sufficient guidance to meet the requirements of a
constitutional delegation of legislative power.
On April 29, 1993, this office issued its opinion #93034,
concluding that LB 183 would be void for the same reasons that the
Nebraska Supreme Court had found LB 781 and LB 911 to be void. In
Marting v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 250 Neb. 134 (1996),
the Court found that despite the legislature's enactment of LB 183
after the adoption of Art. XV, § 19, of the Nebraska Constitution,
the 1984 liquor statutes continued to control issues of liquor
licensing.
Nebraska's liquor statutes have recognized the authority of
local governing bodies to revoke retail liquor licenses "for cause"
since the initial adoption of the Liquor Control Act in 1935. The
power of local governing bodies to cancel retail licenses was added
in 1983. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 53-134 (1984). This same statute
recognized the power of local governing bodies to cancel or revoke
liquor licenses if a licensee was found to have violated "any valid
and subsisting ordinance or regulation duly enacted relating to
alcoholic liquors." The constitutionality of those delegations of
power to the local governing bodies would be subject to the same
standard of review as were the licensing powers delegated through
LB 911, LB 781, and LB 183. A delegation of power to local
governing bodies should withstand constitutional scrutiny as long
as the delegation is not vague; includes adequate standards to
guide the discretion of the local governing bodies; and provides
adequate notice to the licensees regarding what actions may cause
a suspension, cancellation, or revocation of a license. The
proposed language in LB 482 now before the General Affairs
Committee would authorize local governing bodies to suspend,
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February 21, 1997
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cancel, or revoke a license if it is determined in accordance with
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that the
licensee "has violated any provision of the Nebraska Liquor Control
Act, any rule or regulation adopted and promulgated pursuant to the
act, or any ordinance, or resolution, rule, or regulation relating
to alcoholic liquor."
Liquor licensees have notice of the Nebraska Liquor Control
Act, and of the rules and regulations adopted and promulgated by
the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission pursuant to the Act. A
delegation of authority by the Nebraska Legislature to local
governing bodies authorizing them to take action against liquor
licensees who violate such statutes or such rules or regulations of
the Liquor Commission should not be held unconstitutional on the
basis of inadequate notice, vagueness, or inadequate standards to
guide discretion. It is more questionable, however, whether the
legislature can authorize local governing bodies to suspend,
cancel, or revoke liquor licenses based upon a licensee's violation
of a local ordinance or a "resolution" or "rule or regulation" not
promulgated by the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission pursuant to
the Nebraska Liquor Control Act. There are no post-Bosselman
Supreme Court cases addressing the power of local governing bodies
to revoke or cancel liquor licenses. Even if the licensees were
given adequate notice of the ordinances, resolutions, or rules and
regulations of the local governing bodies, the proposed delegation
of authority might be susceptible to challenge as vague, or lacking
clear and definite standards for the exercise of authority by the
local governing bodies.
Sincerely,
DON STENBERG
Attorney General
Laurie Smith Camp
Deputy Attorney General
APPROVED:
Attorney General
44-157-11