AGO Opinion 98006
1997 Neb. Laws LB 70, Application of State CreditCard Requirements to the University of Nebraska, Authority of the University to Establish Banking Relationships
Opinion 98006
DATE: January 21, 1998
SUBJECT: 1997 Neb. Laws LB 70, Application of State CreditCard Requirements to the University of Nebraska, Authority of the University to Establish Banking Relationships
REQUESTED BY: David Heineman, Nebraska State Treasurer
WRITTEN BY: Don Stenberg, Attorney General
Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General
You have requested our opinion with respect to two questions
involving recent legislation pertaining to the use of credit cards
by the State and several additional questions involving your
authority to conduct banking business on behalf of the State as
Nebraska State Treasurer. A number of those questions also involve
issues pertaining to the University of Nebraska and the government
of the University under the Nebraska Constitution. Our responses
to your various questions are set out below. We will divide those
responses as they pertain to questions regarding credit cards and
questions regarding your authority as State Treasurer with respect
to the banking relationships of the State. In each case, we will
set out your entire question and then offer our response.
Use of Credit Cards by State Agencies and the University
During the 1997 legislative session, the Nebraska Legislature
passed LB 70, 1997 Neb. Laws LB 70 (codified as is pertinent at
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-609 and 81-118.01 (Supp. 1997)), which
generally authorizes governmental subdivisions and state agencies
in Nebraska to accept credit card payments as cash payments in
certain instances. Section 81-118.01(1) states:
Any state official or state agency may accept credit
cards, charge cards, or debit cards as a method of cash
payment of any tax, levy, excise, duty, custom, toll,
interest, penalty, fine, license, fee, or assessment of
whatever kind or nature, whether general or special, as
provided by section 77-1702.
In addition, Section 81-118.01(3) grants "any state official or
state agency operating a facility in a proprietary capacity"
similar authority to accept credit cards as a means of cash
payment. Section 81-118.01(5) then goes on to provide, in
pertinent part:
The types of credit cards, charge cards, or debit cards
accepted and the services provided for any state official
or state agency shall be determined by the State
Treasurer and the Director of Administrative Services
with the advice of the committee convened pursuant to
subsection (5) of section 13-609. The State Treasurer
and the director shall contract with one or more credit
card, charge card, or debit card companies or third-party
merchant banks for services on behalf of the state and
those counties, cities, and political subdivisions that
choose to participate in the state contract for such
services.
Your initial questions focus on the University of Nebraska as a
state agency under LB 70, and to what extent, if at all, the
requirements of that bill dealing with acceptance of credit cards
by state agencies pertain to it.
Question No. 1. "Is the University of Nebraska a "state
official or state agency" as described in LB 70 and as
such required to comply with this statute?"
LB 70 does not contain any definition for the terms "state
official" or "state agency." Moreover, we have reviewed the
legislative history of that bill, and those materials offer little
guidance as to the meaning of those terms. However, several
Nebraska cases do offer some insight on the question of whether the
University of Nebraska is a "state agency."
First of all, in Board of Regents of the University of
Nebraska v. County of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398, 48 N.W.2d 221
(1951), a lawsuit by the Regents against Lancaster County on a
claim for drugs and medicines furnished to indigent patients sent
to University Hospital, the court indicated that the Board of
Regents is an "administrative agency of the state." Id. at 402, 48
N.W.2d at 223. More recently, in Catania v. University of
Nebraska, 204 Neb. 304, 282 N.W.2d 27 (1979), overruled on other
grounds Blitzkie v. State, 228 Neb. 409, 422 N.W.2d 773 (1988), the
court indicated that the University is a state agency for purposes
of the State Tort Claims Act. Finally, in State ex rel. Spire V.
Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991), a case which involved
the state Separation of Powers clause and simultaneous service by
a member of the Legislature as a teacher in a state college, the
court stated:
While the Board of Regents is an "independent body
charged with the power and responsibility to manage and
operate the University," it is, nevertheless, an
administrative or executive agency of the state.
Id. at 786, 472 N.W.2d at 415 (citations omitted). On the basis of
those various cases, it appears to us that the University is a
"state agency" which would fall under the language of LB 70. In
addition, we believe that the term "state official" in that
legislation, given its ordinary meaning, is broad enough to cover
members of the University's Board of Regents. Therefore, in our
view, the University is a "state official" or a "state agency"
under the language of LB 70.
Apart from construction of the statutory language found in LB
70, your first question regarding the requirements placed upon the
University with respect to compliance with that legislation also
raises issues under the Nebraska Constitution. Those issues arise
as a result of Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska v.
Exon, 199 Neb. 146, 256 N.W.2d 330 (1977).
The Exon case involved a declaratory judgment action by the
University Board of Regents to determine the constitutionality of
certain statutes under Art. VII, § 10 of the Nebraska Constitution.
That constitutional provision states, as is pertinent:
The general government of the University of Nebraska
shall, under direction of the Legislature, be vested in
a board of not less than six nor more than eight regents
to be designated the Board of Regents of the University
of Nebraska, who shall be elected from and by districts
. . .
At issue in the Exon case was a general appropriation bill which
contained numerous statements directing the Board of Regents or
employees of the University to take certain actions. In addition,
the Court considered whether a number of other statutes which
pertained generally to state agencies and governed such matters as
acceptance of gifts, raises to be given employees, and
participation in such state functions as central data processing,
planning and design for new facilities and centralized state
purchasing could constitutionally be applied to the University
under Art. VII, § 10.
In Exon, the court ultimately concluded that:
. . . although the Legislature may add to or subtract
from the powers and duties of the Regents, the general
government of the University must remain vested in the
Board of Regents and powers or duties that should remain
in the Regents cannot be delegated to other officers or
agencies.
Id. at 149, 256 N.W.2d at 333. Consequently, the statements in the
general appropriation bill at issue in that case which contained
directions to the Board of Regents and University employees were
held to be advisory only and not mandatory. Id. at 149, 256 N.W.2d
at 333. Moreover, the other statutes governing the various
practices of state agencies were held to be inapplicable to the
University because, if applied to that agency, they would result in
an unlawful delegation of the authority vested in the Regents by
the Constitution. Id. at 152, 153, 256 N.W.2d at 334, 335. The
Court also held that while the Legislature has complete control of
the money appropriated to the University from the general revenue
of the State, the funds of the University not derived from taxation
can be expended only by the Board of Regents for the University,
and no annual appropriation of those monies is required when they
are once set apart and appropriated for the use of that
institution. Id. at 151, 152, 256 N.W.2d at 333, 334.
In the present instance, it could be argued, under Exon, that
the choice of credit cards to be used by the University together
with the nature of the contracts for credit card services for the
University are matters involving the general government of that
institution which cannot be delegated under LB 70 to other officers
such as the State Treasurer. However, while the issue is certainly
not without some doubt, we believe that the better argument is to
the contrary, for the reasons discussed below.
First of all, while Exon provides that the "general
government" of the University must remain vested in the Board of
Regents, it does not state that all statutes which pertain to state
government have no application to the University. As we noted in
1979-1980 Rep. Att'y Gen. 166, 167 (Opinion No. 117, dated May 16,
1979):
Despite what Board of Regents v. Exon says, the Board of
Regents is probably not totally insulated from the impact
of general laws passed by the Legislature. When the
Legislature attempts to specifically direct or control
actions of the Board, the legislation is suspect. But we
do not believe the court intended to say that the Board
could ignore laws of general application. [The Board of
Regents] . . . is not, after all, a separate,
independent sovereignty.
As a result, it seems to us that statutes which pertain generally
to state agencies and which do not purport to direct the Board of
Regents as to matters which are central to the University's
educational function or its "government," can have application to
the University, even under Exon. To some extent, examples of such
statutes include those described in University Police Officers
Union, International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 567 v.
University of Nebraska, 203 Neb. 4, 277 N.W.2d 529 (1979) in which
the Court stated that the University is subject to actions before
the Court of Industrial Relations, to the Nebraska Workmen's
Compensation Law and the Nebraska Employment Securities Law. In a
similar fashion, we do not believe that subjecting the University
to the general state credit card arrangements made by the State
Treasurer for all state agencies intrudes, in any significant
sense, in the University's educational function or its
"government." For that reason, we believe that LB 70 is acceptable
under the Exon decision.
We also believe that the decision in the Exon case does not
invalidate the requirements of LB 70 for another reason. In the
University Police Officers case, supra, the Court pointed out that
Art. VII, § 10 of the Nebraska Constitution must be read in
connection with the other provisions of the Nebraska Constitution.
In that regard, the office of the Nebraska State Treasurer has
existed as a constitutional and Executive Branch office since the
first Nebraska Constitution was approved by the people of the State
in 1866. Neb. Const. of 1866, art. III, § 1 (1867). Therefore,
the authority of the University Board of Regents under Art. VII, §
10 of the Nebraska Constitution must be considered in light of Art.
IV, § 1 and the fact that the Nebraska Constitution also
contemplates the existence of and duties for the office of State
Treasurer.
This office has indicated in previous opinions that
constitutional officers such as the State Treasurer have certain
core functions and inherent constitutional authority which cannot
be removed by legislative enactment. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93012
(March 4, 1993); 1969-70 Rep. Att'y Gen. 164 (Opinion No. 110,
dated May 5, 1970). Our research discloses that, since the
inception of statehood in Nebraska, the State Treasurer has had the
duty to receive and keep all money of the State not expressly
required to be received and kept by some other officer. Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 84-602(1) (1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. 1866, c. 4, § 18.
Moreover, since 1891, the State Treasurer has had authority to
deposit the funds of the State in his keeping in state and national
banks. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2301 (1996), 1891 Neb. Laws, c. 50, §
1, p. 347. It is also generally accepted that the Treasurer of a
state has, by law, the custody of the monies of the State. 81A
C.J.S. States § 135. Based upon those historical duties of the
State Treasurer, it seems to us that the core functions of that
office would clearly include maintaining custody of state funds.
Arguably, those core functions would also include general
supervision of State's relationships with state and national banks.
Since Art. VII, § 10 of the Nebraska Constitution must be read
together with Art. IV, § 1, and since the core functions of the
State Treasurer seem to include those matters enumerated above, we
believe that the general government of the University vested in the
Board of Regents under the Nebraska Constitution may only be
exercised in such a way as to preserve the Treasurer's general
authority over the custody of state funds and the supervision of
the State's relationships with state and national banks.
Therefore, the credit card provisions of LB 70 appear acceptable
under the Exon case because they involve the Treasurer's general
supervision of matters related to the State's business with banks.
On the other hand, it remains clear under Exon that the Treasurer's
authority with respect to state funds and general supervision of
the State's relationships with banks cannot be used to intrude upon
the authority of Board of Regents in the general government of the
University.
Question 2. "LB 70 also amends 23-1601, Section 2 and
refers to county treasurer, county official, or political
subdivision official. Regarding this part of LB 70, is
the University of Nebraska a political subdivision and
therefore has an option whether to participate or not in
the state's credit card contract?"
Section 2 of LB 70 (codified at Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-609(5)
(Supp 1997)) allows counties, cities and "other political
subdivisions" that choose not to participate in the state credit
card contract to negotiate and contract independently or
collectively with credit card companies or other financial
institutions for the provision of credit card services. Your
second question goes to whether the University is a "political
subdivision" under that portion of LB 70.
In Catania v. University of Nebraska, supra, the Nebraska
Supreme Court considered whether a negligence action against the
University of Nebraska should be brought under the State's
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act or the State Tort Claims
Act. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the University is a
state agency which must be sued under the State Tort Claims Act
rather than a political subdivision of the State. The Court came
to that conclusion, in part, because some of the indicia of a
political subdivision such as geographical area and boundaries and
the power to tax do not apply to the University. The Court stated:
The University is statewide in its service, has no
geographical limitations in the boundary sense of the
word and has no power to levy taxes. It is completely
dependent, initially at least, on the appropriations made
by the Legislature, as are all state agencies.
Id. at 308, 309, 282 N.W.2d at 30. The Court added, " . . .
considering our own statutes and constitutional provisions as well
as our own case law, we believe and hold that the Board of Regents
of the University of Nebraska is an agency of the state." Id. at
311, 282 N.W.2d at 31, 32. For the reasons discussed in the
Catania case, we do not believe that the University is a political
subdivision for purposes of LB 70, and that the University does not
have an option to decline to participate in the state credit card
contract under § 13-609(5).
Treasurer's Authority to Establish Banking
Relationships for the State
The second group of questions included in your opinion request
letter go to your authority as State Treasurer to establish the
banking relationships for the State of Nebraska. You cited a
number of provisions to us in Chapter 77 Article 23 of the Nebraska
Statutes, the Article pertaining to the "Deposit and Investment of
Public Funds." Your various questions are in that area.
Questions No. 3. "In reviewing the above statutes and
related statutes, does any state official or state
agency, other than the State Treasurer, have the
authority to establish a banking relationship on behalf
of the State?"
Two of the Nebraska statutes which you cited to us in regard
to this question are Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2301 (1996) and Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 77-2309 (1996). Section 77-2301, provides, as is
pertinent:
The State Treasurer shall deposit, and at all times keep
on deposit for safekeeping, in the state or national
banks, or some of them doing business in this state and
of approved standing and responsibility, the amount of
money in his hands belonging to the several current funds
in the state treasury.
Section 77-2309 states:
It is made the duty of the State Treasurer to use all
reasonable and proper means to secure to the state the
best terms for the depositing of the money belonging to
the state, consistent with the safekeeping and prompt
payment of the funds of the state when demanded.
We are unaware, generally, of any other statutes which specifically
give other state officials or state agencies the authority to
deposit the state's funds in a bank. As a result, to the extent
that "establishing a banking relationship" in your question is
synonymous with depositing funds in the state treasury in a bank,
we believe that your office is the only agency with such
authority.
Question No. 4. "Regarding the receipt and disbursement
of University funds, including non state (sic) tax
sources, are all University funds to be receipted through
the State Treasurer's Office?"
Several Nebraska Statutes have a bearing on your fourth
question. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-128 (1994) provides:
The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of all the
funds of the university. Disbursements from the funds
named in sections 85-124 to 85-127 [the Temporary
University Fund, the University Cash Fund, the United
States Morrill Fund, and the United States Experiment
Station Fund] shall be made in accordance with the
provisions of law relating to the disbursement of
university funds in the hands of the State Treasurer as
provided by law.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-129 (1994) provides:
The State Treasurer shall be the treasurer of the state
university and the custodian of all funds donated to the
university or to the Agricultural Research Division by
the United States, including the Morrill, Hatch, and
Adams funds, all other donations, gifts, and bequests,
income from land and productive funds, fees paid by
students, and all funds for the use of the university
derived from any source, except (1) funds created by
taxation and paid into the state treasury as taxes, and
(2) the University Trust Fund which shall be held and
managed in the manner provided by section 85-123.01.
Finally, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-123.01 (1994), the University
Trust Fund, which consists of all property, real or personal,
acquired by the Board of Regents by donation or bequest to it,
"shall be held and managed in such manner as the Board of Regents
. . . shall determine."
When those various statutes are read in their entirety and
together, as they must be, it appears to us that the State
Treasurer is the custodian of all funds of the University and of
all funds donated to the University except those funds created by
taxation and those funds in the University Trust Fund. We believe
that authority to act as custodian necessarily implies that the
funds in question will be receipted into the State Treasury.
Consequently, for those funds for which you are the custodian, we
believe that they should be receipted into the State Treasury even
if they involve non-tax sources. On the other hand, you are
apparently not the custodian of the University Trust Fund under §
85-129, and under § 85-123.01, that fund may be held and managed as
the Board of Regents shall determine. Therefore, we do not believe
that funds accruing to the University Trust Fund need be receipted
through the State Treasurer's office in the event that the Board of
Regents elects to have those funds held and managed elsewhere.
Question No. 5. "Are all University funds to be
disbursed by the State Treasurer and Director of
Administrative Services at the direction of the Board of
Regents?"
Again, there are Nebraska Statutes which specifically deal
with this question. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-130 (1994) states, as is
pertinent:
The university funds, other than those created by
taxation, shall be held subject to the order of the Board
of Regents and shall be disbursed for the purposes
prescribed by law, upon presentation of warrants to the
Director of Administrative Services, to be issued on
certificates of the Board of Regents executed as required
by law, . . .
In addition, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-131 (1994) provides:
Disbursements from the university funds shall be made by
the State Treasurer upon warrants drawn by the Director
of Administrative Services, who shall issue warrants upon
certificates issued by the Board of Regents, signed by
the secretary and president.
On the basis of those statutes, it appears to us that all
University funds are to be disbursed by the State Treasurer and
Director of Administrative Services at the direction of the Board
of Regents with the exception of the university funds in the
University Trust Fund. To the extent that those funds are not held
by the State Treasurer as provided under § 85-123.01, then those
funds would not be disbursed by the Treasurer at the direction of
the Board of Regents.
Question 6. "Does the University have statutory
authority to establish a banking relationship to deposit
the university funds described in [Neb. Rev. Stat. §] 85-
125 [1996] and to disburse such funds independently
instead of using normal state disbursement procedures?"
Your final question involves the University Cash Fund
established by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-125 (1994). That statute
states, as is pertinent:
The University Cash Fund shall consist of the
matriculation and diploma fees, registration fees,
laboratory fees, tuition fees, summer session or school
fees, all other money or fees collected from students by
the authority of the Board of Regents for university
purposes, and receipts from all university activities
collected by the board in connection with the operation
of the university. . . . All money accruing to the
University Cash Fund shall become available when
appropriated by the legislature for the use of the
university and its activities and shall at all times be
subject to the orders of the Board of Regents
accordingly. No warrant shall be issued against such
fund unless there is money in the hands of the State
Treasurer sufficient to pay the same. The board shall
cause all money belonging to this fund, which is received
by its authority at the university, to be paid over from
time to time, as the same is received, to the State
Treasurer . . .
It appears to us that, under the express provisions of § 85-125
together with §§ 85-130 and 83-131, cited above, the Board of
Regents shall "cause all money belonging to the [University Cash
Fund] . . . to be paid over . . . to the State Treasurer"
where it can be disbursed by the State Treasurer and the Director
of Administrative Services at the direction of the Board.
Consequently, we do not believe that the University has statutory
authority to establish a banking relationship in order to deposit
the university funds described in § 85-125 and to disburse such
funds independently rather than using normal state disbursement
procedures.
We understand that it might be possible to argue, based upon
the Exon case, supra, that application of § 85-125 to require the
University to deposit its cash fund in the state treasury rather
than having an independent banking relationship impermissibly
intrudes upon the authority of the Board of Regents to govern the
University. However, for the reasons discussed at length in
response to your question No. 1 above, we do not believe that Exon
requires a contrary reading of the statutes at issue. Moreover, we
believe that the argument articulated in response to your Question
No. 1 above with respect to the core duties of the State Treasurer
is even more significant in this area, since it more clearly
involves the Treasurer's traditional involvement in the State's
banking relationships.
Sincerely yours,
DON STENBERG
Attorney General
Dale A. Comer
Assistant Attorney General